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"What is a title deed anyway? It is just a pièce of paper" (DN 29/02/96) These words
were spoken by a Kenyan Minister after the bloody éviction of twelve thousand families
by the minister's private army and police from an immigration zone in southern Kenya
in October 1993. His words blunüy summarise growing conflicts over and tensions
about access to land on the Afncan continent. As recently as 1989, the World Con-
ference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development noted that "... land avaüability was
not a major problem m the context of most African countries" (WCARRD 1989:17).
However, nowadays, access to land is becoming problematical. Afnca's land use and
tenure fronüers are shifting. Is the continent heading for a situation in which
landlessness and unequal land distribution patterns resemble those of the Asian and Latin
Amencan continents?
In this chapter expériences on the Afncan continent, m Kenya and South Africa m
particular, will be discussed. A major land reform was started m Kenya in the 1950s.
It was based mainly on western ideas of mdividual freehold tenure, but also allowed the
registration of group titles, especially m the dry zones of the country. Recently, South
Africa also embarked on the development of a comprehensive land reform programme,
lts goal is to address the legacy of 'apartheid' in relation to land distribution and to
create security of tenure in land rights for South Afncans (Repubhc of South Africa
1996). Could Kenyan expériences of group tenure provide a model for the South African
land reform policy? Or should they adopt 'modern' concepts of individual tenure
Systems?
Access to land in Africa: facts, policies, and concepts
During 1975-90, the world's developing régions witnessed an increase in the agricultural
population of some 355 million, whilst the arable area under production expanded with
46.5 million ha. Africa (66 percent) and the Far and Near East (59 percent) show high
proportions of the agricultural population, as compared to Latin America (26 percent)
in 1990. The 1975 percentages for these régions were 74, 68, and 37 percent, respec-
tively. This means that Latin America, in particular, has reduced the relative importance
of its agricultural population in the total labour force, whereas the réductions m other
régions are only modest. Table l shows the change in land available for cultivation. In
the latter half of the 1980s the expansion of land for agriculture slowed down worldwide,


















































V~- O rO f~
(N i — i 00 b-
i— i oo t-^ cô
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ON" I-H" IA* OO"
IA vo vo vo
O! O Ol N-
01 00 ^t- CO
00 r̂ l ^^ ^^
(N co rO co
rN r̂ l fN r-J
O O iTi LP,
in in I-H •— i
r— { i— i ITl ITl
^ ̂  «-" Th
U-l l-*-l *--!- 1
O O 00 CO
•*• (S 1̂  N-
S- "̂ t" ro ro
i-H i— 1 r-H i— <
CO CO 00 GO
C»— 1 l-t-j "-̂ -i
c^ ^~ ON î~
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whereas the increase in the agricultural population was slightly higher. For Africa,
however, the percentage increase in arable land (2.4 percent) is very much less than the
growth in the agricultural population (11.4 percent). The effect of this imbalance in
growth has been increased pressure on land.
Landlessness or near-landlessness seems to be on the rise all over the world, in the
urban as well as in the rural areas. Landless agricultural workers do not have access to
this productive resource. Near-landlessness has been defined by Leonard (1989:13) as
"... access to plots of land too small to provide a minimal livelihood under existing land
use patterns and techmcal capabilities".
Landlessness is principally a phenomenon of the Asian countries. Nearly two-thirds
of landless and near-landless people live in Asia, as against one-fifth in Africa and one-
tenth in Latin America. In terms of percentage of agricultural people who are landless
or near-landless, Africa remains less affected, although it is estimated that the increase
m landlessness is highest there. Table 2 shows an increase over the 1980-85 period of
11.8 percent for pure landless and 10.5 percent for near-landless in Afnca. The mean
figures for the developing régions of the world were 5.3 and 7.1 percent, respectively.
Table 2 also shows that inequality in land distribution is most profound in Latin
America. Africa has the least unequal distribution of land holdings, whilst Asia occupies
an intermediate position. Among African countries, Madagascar and Kenya have the most
distorted land distribution pattern. For Kenya this is expressed in a gini-coefficient of
0.77 (1981). Also, almost 32 percent of all rural households are estimated as having
holdings of less than 1.0 ha.
Three major lines of policy towards land prevailed in Africa during the early 1980s.
In some countries, there was a shift towards the socialisation of land by way of co-opera-
tives and state farms (e.g. Mozambique). In other countnes, the privatisation and
individualisation of land was either continued or begun (e.g. Kenya, Malawi). Thirdly,
some countries made adaptations to existing tenures to modify the relations between
the tribal chiefs and the state, as in the Gambia and Lesotho (see WCARRD 1988:38).
In général, the switch towards the second type of land policy is what seems to be
prevailing in Africa at the present time. "The last five years have seen the wholesale
abandonment of economie planning based on social property concepts to a planning
pattern emphasizing some form of private property rights" (Riddell 1988:39).
This 'property rights' paradigm is based on neo-classical economie théories. It argues
that traditional African land-tenure Systems induce inefficient allocation of resources,
because property rights are not clearly defined, costs and rewards are not internalised,
and contracts are not legal or enforceable (Johnson c.i. Barrows and Roth 1990:266).
The theory holds that individualisation of land tenure (1) increases the landholder's
security of tenure; (2) increases investments by improvmg tenure security; and (3) will
transfer land to those who are able to extract a higher value of product from the land
as more productive users bid land away from less productive users (see Barrows and
Roth 1990:269).
Land tenure concepts define how individuals gain access to, and acquire use rights
over, land, either temporanly or permanently (see Ezemoah 1987:36). There are many
ways in which land rights are laid down. It is possible that title deeds have been given
out (statutory law) or that land is transferred by a traditional law of succession (customary
law). Hellen (1977:54-74) makes a twofold division within the category of land which
falls under the régulations of the statutory law:
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Pure Landless Near Landless
(äs % of all rural households)
318
11 283
29 0 78 0
30 0 55 0
-
37 0 43 0
390
770
41 0 60 0 (<2 0 ha)
410
76 0 (<2 0 ha)
Source WCARRD 1988 Note the gim-coefficient is a measure of mequahty in distribution
mcreasmg from 0 to l
1 private land - all land which is owned, held or occupied under a freehold title, or
a leasehold title, or a certificate or claim, or which is registered as pnvate land under
a Registered Land Act
2 public land - all land which is occupied, used or acquired by the government and
any other land not bemg customary or private land.
The dominant land use System in Afnca remams customary tenure The land is gener-
ally held by the commumty with fairly clearly defmed spatial and temporal use rights
allocated to its members (Field-Juma 1996 18) The raies regulatmg access to and use
of land are established pnmanly by an mdividual's position in thé social group controlling
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a particular territory. Land underlying customary law can be distinguished äs: (1)
communally used; (2) individually used; or (3) reserve land - not yet allotted. Thus the
characteristics of community-based customary tenurial rights vary äs under statutory law.
As Lynch and Talbott (1995:26) indicate, there exists a bündle of individual and group
rights which dérive from long-term relationships established between local peoples and
the natural resources that sustain them. Moreover, Lynch and Talbott stress that property
rights are not contingent on state grants or documentation. Nor should they be. Com-
munity based property rights are as legitimate as state-sanctioned individual rights.
Land reform in South Africa*
Landlessness is one of South Africa's most crippling problems. The Mandela Government
tries to tackle these issues in its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).
Land reform is presented as an essential pré-condition for thé RDP to succeed.
During thé white-minority government's philosophy of 'apartheid', thé ultimate aim
of this policy of separate development was to create a 'homeland' or 'national state' for
each black ethnie group in South Africa. Shortly after thé Union of South Africa was
formed, this policy was given législative backing in thé Natives Land Act of 1913 (Riddell
et al. 1986:177). Land was held in trust and administered by traditional authorities on
behalf of the community. In 1955 the Tomlinson commission advised to the National
Party Government to give freehold title to the black population in these 'scheduled' areas;
this marked the birth of the 'homelands' policy whereby black groups in South Africa
were granted homelands with their own semi-independent governments (see Houghton
1956). Still customary tenure remained the dominant form in the reserves areas. By
contrast, virtually all of the agricultural land outside the homelands was held in freehold
tenure mainly by the white population.
In 1976 Transkei became the first homeland to gain 'independence'. The South
African government regarded these homelands as independent countries, but they were
to convince the majority of black South Africans or the rest of the world of this status.
In the early 1980s, the homelands represented 13 percent of the total land in South
Africa - allocated to 89 percent of the population (see Riddel et al. 1986:178). In 1995
approximately 17.6 million people, 58 percent of the African population, lived in the
former reserves (bantustans), on 13.6 percent of the land. The remaining 22.4 million
South Africans lived on the 86 percent land formerly owned or controlled by whites.
This included 12.8 million Africans, most of whom lived in townships within commuting
distance of white urban areas. The 3.4 million coloured people were spread over
townships and rural reserves. Some l million Indians lived mainly in urban townships.
Finally, the majority of the 5.2 million whites lived in small towns, urban, and metro-
politan areas, while approximately 55,000 were farmers Qensen 1996:4).
The government land reform policy is to redress the injustices of colomalisation and
apartheid; to fester national reconciliation and stability; to underpin economie growth;
and to improve household welfare and alleviate poverty. The challenge is to find a way
of redistributing land to the needy while at the same time maintaining public confidence
in the land market. The land reform programme is made up of three main components:
I am most grateful to Henry Bredekamp for comments on an earher draft of this section
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land restitution, land redistribution, and land tenure reform (Repubhc of South Africa
1996 u)
Map l Republic of South Afnca land reform data
II 298 ̂  A
Fi 4
R Land Reform Pilot Project Districts
u Restitution Claims
E Redistribution
Source Republic of South Afnca 1996
Issues of restitution concern m the first place the relocation of some 3 5 million people
dispossessed by racially discnminatory législation and practice Restitution can take the
form of restoration of the land from which clavmants were dispossessed, the provision
of alternative land, payment of compensation or a combinaüon of the above measures
One of the most controversial éléments m the land reform proposais is the clause which
allows the govemment to expropnate land at payments below market value
The purpose of the redistribution element is to provide the poor with land for
residential and productive purposes m order to improve their hvelihood Redistribution
issues involve assisting poor people to obtain credit for land purchase m addition to
grants and subdividmg agricultural land such that land aspirations, économie develop-
ment and ecological conservation are served at the same time Redistribution will be
largely based on willmg-buyer-willmg-seller arrangements In many cases, commumties
are expected to pool their resources to negotiate, buy and jomtly hold land under a
formal title deed
The purpose of the land tenure reform is to extend secunty of tenure to all South
Africans under diverse forms of tenure Qtizens should be supported to choose the form
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of tenure most appropriate to their needs and conditions. For example, the Government
is committed to legally recognising communal and group tenure and will Institute interim
protective measure to this end in order to reduce tenure insecurity amongst holders of
informal rights. Where communities choose to retain communal or group tenure, they
should be able to décide at the local level how the System will be administered, choosing
from a range of options, including traditional authorities, local governments, trusts,
communal property associations, and other models (Jensen 1996:19). In collaboration
with stakeholders, including the private and non-government sectors, the Government
will set up tenure reform projects in selected test areas to establish best practice. For
this reason, South African NGOs have now turned to other parts in Africa to leam from
other land tenure reform expériences. Kenya, in particular, is of interest to the South
Africans because of interesting similarities with the South African situation in the areas
of redistribution, restitution and tenure reform.
Lessons from Kenyan land reform expériences
In Kenya, high potential agricultural land is limited to some 20 percent of its territory.
Moreover, it has a distorted land ownership structure, which is a legacy of the colonial
period, during which high-potential arable and good pasture land was reserved for white
settlers. No real correction was implemented in the post-colonial period. By the late
1970s some 2.4 percent of Kenyan holdings accounted for some 32 percent of Kenya's
total arable land. In 1990, landlessness in Kenya was estimated to affect some 10 percent
of the total population increasing by at least 1.5 percent annually. In the late, 1960s, in
order to deal with the problem of diminishing land availability, the World Bank urged
breaking away from the community-based systems of land, which ensured security of
ownership to certain groups. Instead, a free land market should be created in order to
enable more people to emigrate away from the most densely populated to the less
densely populated régions.
Besides the transfer of land formerly held by Europeans to African farmers and the
création of settlement schemes, the Kenyan land use policy was mainly directed at the
adjudication and registration of land in the 'non-scheduled' areas. The rationale for this
replacement of customary land rights by individual tenure arrangements was to create
a collatéral for loans and the encouragement of long-term investments. A negative
conséquence, ho wever, has been the création of a group of landless people, as land has
become increasmgly concentrated in the hands of a happy few. This newly emerging
elite of African farmers is constituted particularly of businessmen, politicians and civil
servants. This probably explains the high political constraints for a real land reform
policy within Kenya. This is in line with expériences in Latin America, where the
outcome of most land reform programmes has been disappointing (Kleinpenning
1978:95ff). If an impressive land reform is not carried out, a process by which the poor
may seil land to their wealthy neighbours and migrate to the semi-arid areas will, in all
probability, continue and intensify. In the dry areas, these immigrants compete with a
rapidly growing young génération of land-seeking pastoralists and with those Kenyans
interested in land spéculation (see Migot-Adholla 1981:44). We now turn to these dry
areas of Kenya, which are the home of the pastoralists and, increasingly, the asylum of
the 'spontaneously' land-seeking farmers.
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Maosai pastoralists: people, land and livestock
The Maasai are the one but largest pastoral group in Kenya. Today (1997), they number
approximately 500,000 persons, as compared to some 25,000 Maasai at the beginning
of this Century. As a result, the Maasai now have to manage with a less favourable
number of animais per head (5.5 Livestock Equivalent/Active Adult Male Equivalent)
(e.g. 1930:18.0 LE/AAME). To offset these pressures, the Maasai are intensifying (i.e,
keeping more improved breeds to raise milk and méat production) and diversifying their
economy (wage labour, cultivation).
k is important to stress that the Maasai commons are not the equivalent of 'open
access' regimes. Because of the seasonality and erratic nature of rainfall and forage
availability in the district, access to grazing areas and water is secured in the pastoral
Community by traditional resource management institutions. These customary arrange-
ments operate on different geographical scales. At the sectional level, the Maasai regulate
access to land and water resources. Members of other sections are obliged to ask foï ,
permission to enter another section's territory. Families co-operate at the neighbourhood, „'
level, too, e.g. by preserving pastures for dry season grazing. The sélective use of water *
sources, some of which are individually owned, is also part of these resource usô '
arrangements. These traditional forms of resource control are now being eroded. .
Maasai pre-independence land history ,t
î
The 'Kenyan' Maasai districts (Kajiado, Narok and Trans Mara) cover some 39,000 km*
as compared to some 50-60,000 km2 at the end of the 19th Century. At the start of the,
Colonial period, British settlers were offered large areas of land. When the response feoa*
Europe was very limited, the Colonial administration turned to South Africa. The Boer$,
in particular, who had been defeated by the British in the Anglo-Boer war, were attracte$ ,
by the 'settler-friendly' land policy and législation. Maasai pastoralists lost their Ïi^br
potential grazing areas to the Boers and other white settlers. This area finally caröe 8
be known as Kenya's 'White Highlands'. The Maasai, were 'given' reserves of thew ÖWÄ
'in return' under the 1904 and 1911 Treaties. In fact the Maasai were simply depB&eS
of their best pastures and, in the end, lost some 35 percent of their former territöïy {$%&
Rutten 1992).
Following the Maasai, other African groups were also confined to allocated
The situation worsened for the latter after World War 11 when settlers started
agricultural labourers back to their reserves. This eventually escalated into art
struggle between the Mau Mau movement and the Colonial Government. In
the 'Swynnerton' Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agnculture was
in 1954. One of the central éléments in the Plan was the consolidation and re
of titles in the high and medium potential zone. Traditional land tenure
removed, as it was considered to be blocking the way towards the intens
African agriculture.
In 1960, just prior to Independence, the British Government passed an.
Council ending the original réservation of the 'White Highlands' for farming%
peans only. Land transfer schemes, based on a willing buyer/willing seller
constructed to promote the graduai purchase of land by Africans. The most ta
and best known of these was the Million-Acre Seulement Scheme (see e.g. Leo
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This settlement programme benefitted Africans of all classes, although m later years
làfgër and more fertile tracts were accumulated by nch, prominent, successful Kenyans
(see Siddle and Swindell 1990:82).
- For the rangelands, opinions differed as to the nght approach. This changed by the
1960s, following a mixture of events which set the tone for new land tenure
v$crangements in the southern rangelands. Firstly, local level Maasai poliücians, supported
thé Local County Council, starled acquinng large individual ranches without the legal
to do so. Both the Bntish Administration and local Maasai feared a land grab,
«g^condly, the Maasai suffered from a sévère drought. Several reports were written
that the "... era of unregulated and free use of the land resources in the
itado District should be terminated as soon as possible" (Fallon 1962:47). Thirdly,
was a fear that more land would be lost to Game Reserves or National Parte.
ty, the Maasai feared that Independence would end the closed status allowing non-
to enter freely into their districts. This scenano had been witnessed by the Maasai
the earty 1960s following land consolidation in the Ngong and Loitokitok high-
zones of the district.
"' A the Lancaster House Conference in London, deaiing with Kenya's Independence,
i délégation expressed their discontent with a possible loss of the special status
territory. Likewise, the Maasai claimed the return of the fertile pastures lost to
ans. They did not want to evict Europeans willing to stay, but expected to
s'lfae rents from the lease of this land. The British confirmed the security of tenure
tees of the Treaties, but disagreed on any claim for compensations for the loss
ptttside the present Maasai Reserves. The Maasai "... had given up land under
-and 1911 Agreements and could not now claim it back" (see KNA/MAC/KEN/
: private communal awnership under statutory law
Ü4960S discussions on land tenure issues m Kajiado District continued and
au of the Maasai sections accepted the group ranch concept as mtroduced
*r)d Bank-sponsored Kenya Livestock Development Project in 1969. In short,
a .group ranch meant the setting aside of a certain area of land to be
.ed by a group of people who were recorded and registered as thé légal
30gh membership of thé particular ranch. The land was held by the Group
on behalf of all other members and a Group Ranch Committee was made
for'tte conduct of all business, including the enforcement of grazing quotas
management. By 1980, some 75 percent of the Kajiado District area was
total of 51 group ranches. Initially, the Maasai had requested the World
j the*whole of one section as a group ranch. This was refused mamly for
'us.
tfon of the group ranch had organisational, legal and economical
SK'Fostüve aspects of the group ranch concept from a Maasai point of view
of the loss of land to elite Maasai and non-Maasai immigrants and
pl,Öf boreholes, dams, troughs and cattle dips. From a donor perspective,
were overshadowed by such problems and faüures as disappoint-
and difficulties in loan repayment; the contmuing trespassing of
es; refusai to de-stock ranches; and no real transformation to a
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market-onented livestock production. Funds were withdrawn in the late 1970s and, m
the early 1980s, calls were heard for the subdivision of the group ranches. Many Maasai
were tired of corrupt group ranch commutées and rieh individual ranchers illegally using
the group ranch pastures. After some hésitation and opposition from the Ministries of
Livestock and Wildlife & Tourism, the Central Government gave permission for subdivi-
sion of the group ranches. Overall, it may be concluded that, in many respects, the
group ranch concept was an artificial création which lacked a firm traditional sociological
as well as ecological basis, ït was overambitious in aiming at destocking of the pastures
and the commercialisation of production, while hardly taking into account the pastor-
alists' stratégies and household needs. The final outcome of these problems and the
resulting frustration was a growing wish among many Maasai for the subdivision of the
group ranch into individually owned shares. By 1990 almost 80 percent of the groups
had decided to dissolve the ranches.
Individualising the commons
We shall consider in detail the results of the subdivision of Olkinos group ranch. This
ranch, which was formed in 1969, was the first group ranch to be subdivided among
its members in 1986. Over 90 percent stated that they were very favourably disposed
towards the principle of subdivision. Non-registered and mainly young Maasai, who were
afraid of becoming squatters, objected. Field research in 1990 yielded the following
results:
a Stratification: the process of subdivision was most favourable to: group ranch commvt-
tee members who allocated themselves and friends above average-sized ranches; land
speculators (both Maasai and outsiders); the political and business elite, who were
able to buy cheaply a large ranch close to Nairobi; non-Maasai middle class farmers
and (foreign) agro-business companies. In some cases, poor Maasai could rent out
their land and build up their herd. Those who suffered most were: people who
obtained a small parcel of land or none at all (widows and 'youngsters'); famüy
members of land vendors who 'misappropriated' the money (modern house, car,
drinking); loan defaulters who were forced to seil all or part of their ranch;
b Economie viability: ranch sizes were insufficient for 56.6 of households in the wet
season and for 95.4 percent in the dry season. By 1990, these proportions had
increased to 67.6 and 96.3 percent, respectively;
c Ecological viability: it was found that, at 1986 stocking densities, 56.0 and 90.0
percent of the ranches should be considered overstocked in the short (1.59 ha/LE)
and long term (4.45 ha/LE), respectively. A mere 4.2 percent of livestock keepers
decreased their herd size after subdivision, as compared with 14.7 percent who
actively increased their herd size. This, in combination with the sale of land, led to
an increase in livestock densities;
d Range management: the Maasai still prefer to use their ranches communally. They are
well aware of the non-equilibrium character of their semi-arid area. Mainly wealthy
immigrants who bought large parcels of land nearby and non-Maasai immigrants
practising cultivation erected a fence. Maasai invested in wells and water pans;
e Commercialisation: no real switch to a market and meat-oriented economy could be
detected. The composition of the herd reflected a milk and subsistence-onented
livestock economy;
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f Social and cultural: the individualisation of land ownership has intensified an ongoing
process towards single household settlements (borna). This puts a strain on short term
assistance and the level of co-operation between former group ranch members;
g Land fragmentation and transfer: within 4 years of subdivision over 55 percent of the
owners applied to further subdivide their individual parcel. This was mainly done
for selling purposes. No spécifie set of characteristics could be discerned for the group
of sellers. Nevertheless, the group of former Olkinos committee members turned out
to be foremost among the group of non-sellers. Among the group of buyers, non-
Maasai predominated (80 percent);
h Loan acquisition: in Olkinos only 6 percent of the ranchers used their new title deeds
in acquiring a loan. Selling was stated to be much a faster, less difficult way of
acquiring money than mortgaging.
Neo-classical theorists might argue that the land market will boost agricultural produc-
tion. Recent activities started in subdivided group ranches concentrate on either highly
capital-intensive commercial production (such as horticukural industries) or irrigated
or small-scale rainfed agriculture. In both cases the ecological sustainability should be
questioned. Foreign companies extract huge amounts of water to irrigate flowers for
export to Europe. Food crops have been irrigated with borehole water, resulting in
salinisation of the plots within two years. Environmental dégradation might well be the
result of the freehold land market in a semi-arid area. The World Bank (1992) finally
came to réalise the rationale for pastoral groups' mobility and herding stratégies as it
stated that "African pastoralists, such as the Maasai and Samburu of Kenya are able to
exploit apparently marginal savannahs (...) development projects that do not take existing
practices into account often fail".
Other factors influence the context of land reform which hardly form part of eco-
nomie theory. In général, the relation between Maasai and the (non-Maasai) immigrants
is tense. Sortie immigrants from Olkinos were forced to flee back to Nairobi and have
still not returned. In neighbouring Narok District, the situation turned more serious in
1993, as many Kikuyu were killed and thousands chased, from their legally bought
parcels at the instigation of local politicians in revenge for their voting for opposition
candidates. These expériences and the continuous call by Maasai politicians for exclusive
land rights have made Kikuyu afraid to buy land in Maasailand.
Finally, the corruption of the land allocation process is inévitable when a valuable
good is allocated free and rationed administratively. In Kajiado District, where group
ranches have been subdivided, elite groups, Maasai and outsiders, have profited most.
Conclusion
Access to land is becommg increasingly a problem in Africa today. In addition to a
growth in the human population, tenure reforms are foremost responsible for this.
Statu tory law is replacing customary laws. The standard argument for tenure reform
centres on the rôle of uncertainty in discouraging investment on land that is held
without long-term security. Land title that enhances such security may induce investment
and productivity increases both from the demand side, as farmers become more certain
of reaping the benefits of investment in the future, and from the supply side, by
affording farmers better access to credit. The rationale for this 'replacement' paradigm,
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however, can be questioned from the economie, ecological and social point of view,
especially for those régions where agro-ecological conditions are limiting and local
groups lack the necessary expérience and formai éducation to compete with better
equipped groups in society.
We have discussed the Kenyan history of land tenure reform with particular attention
to the pros and cons of group titles in the semi-arid areas. We concluded that, in spite
of a land reform started in the 1950s, under which land in the hands of whites was
transferred to Africans, an unequal land distribution has remained a feature of Kenya.
The Maasai pastoralists, in particular, have lost huge amounts of land. After the loss of
their high-potential lands in Central Kenya, they now face the influx of agncultural
groups and large-scale capitalist farmers following the individualisation of land held
under statutory group title. This communally-owned private title, introduced in the late
1960s, replaced traditional community-based management régulations over resources.
The group ranches failed, mainly because of their sociologically and ecologically unsus-
tainable format. Growing negative feelings towards the group ranch concept fuelled the
ultimate call for subdivision into individually-owned plots to bring back flexibüity in
herd and range management in the hands of the individual producer and prevent
exploitation of the poor by the rieh.
Most notably, however, has been the effect of the création of a land market. It is not
so much individualisation as such, but rather the commoditisation of land that has been
responsible for a rapidly growing stratification in thé Maasai area. Many Maasai 'were
not ready' for the reform in land tenure. They engaged themselves, sometimes tricked,
into land transfers to better-off segments within society. Which lessons can be drawn
for thé South African land reform, in particular experiments in group tenure?
1 adaptation: interventions and methods of enfoncement should build on local land
tenure practices;
2 security of tenure: group titles can be instrumental in assisting large groups of less
well-off people. The most appropriate set of tenure rights should be determined by
the proper mix of ecological conditions and socio-économie situation;
3 timing: movement toward individual tenure reform should be initiated only when
technical and socio-économie conditions warrant it. Local groups and NGOs should
be involved in an open and transparant allocation. Most of all, people should be
aware of thé value of land and thé possibilities for sustainable development in thé
individualised plots.
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